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> Summary prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (b) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 and paragraph 5 of the annex to Council resolution 16/21

Qatar*

The present report is a summary of seven stakeholders' submissions¹ to the universal periodic review. It follows the general guidelines adopted by the Human Rights Council in its decision 17/119. It does not contain any opinions, views or suggestions on the part of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), nor any judgement or determination in relation to specific claims. The information included herein has been systematically referenced in endnotes and, to the extent possible, the original texts have not been altered. As provided for in Resolution 16/21 of the Human Rights Council, where appropriate, a separate section is provided for contributions by the national human rights institution of the State under review that is accredited in full compliance with the Paris Principles. The full texts of all submissions received are available on the OHCHR website. The report has been prepared taking into consideration the periodicity of the review and developments during that period.

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The present document was not edited before being sent to United Nations translation services.

I. Information provided by the accredited national human rights institution of the State under review in full compliance with the Paris Principles

A. Background and framework

- 1. National Human Rights Committee of Qatar (NHRC) noted the establishment of several institutions in the field of human rights that play an important role in monitoring the compliance of government agencies with the fundamental principles of human rights as well as its role in spreading the culture of human rights.²
- 2. Newly established institutions such as: The Supreme Council for Family Affairs, Qatar foundation for Child and Women Protection, Qatar Foundation for Combating Human Trafficking, the Doha Centre for Media Freedom, and NHRC monitor human rights violations of governmental and non-governmental organisations.³
- 3. NHRC recommended amending the Law No. 38 of 2005 on the acquisition of Qatari nationality, in order to achieve equality between all citizens.⁴
- 4. NHRC criticized law No. 17 of 2002 on the Protection of the Community, which provides official exemption from the prohibition of arbitrary arrest and detention, hence the restrictions to the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.⁵ The NHRC recommended amending the law, because it grants law enforcement officers broad power to arrest individuals for prolonged period of time without considering the restrictions of the Criminal Procedure Law No. 23 for 2004.⁶
- 5. NHRC recommended amending the Law No. 3 of 2004 on Combating Terrorism, which grants the extension of pre-trial detention and other punitive measures that restrict the right of freedom of movement and residence.⁷
- 6. NHRC recommended amending the Law of the Associations and Private Institutions Law in order to remove restrictions on the establishment of associations.⁸
- 7. NHRC recommended amending the Law regulating the entry and exit of expatriates into Qatar, and to cancel the sponsorship system and the exit permits.⁹

B. Implementation of international human rights obligations

- 8. Regarding to equality and nationality rights, NHRC noted that Qatari women married to non-Qatari men are subject to discrimination as their children cannot obtain Qatari citizenship, as per article 34 of the Nationality Act for 2005.¹⁰
- 9. NHRC warned that women's participation in the decision-making process is still limited, in particular with regards to their participation in the Parliament.¹¹ There are currently no female representatives in The *Shura* Council (the legislative branch) as the current law only authorizes nomination of males.¹²
- 10. NHRC noted that the advancement of women is the responsibility of the government agencies, and that lack of civil associations concerned with women's issues, and the continued promotion of the stereotyped image of women by traditional culture, leads to restricting their participation in certain areas, and limits their access to leadership positions in different institutions.¹³

- 11. NHRC warned about the limitations on political participation for naturalised Qataris or persons whose citizenship was withdrawn but subsequently restored which defies the principle of equality embedded in the constitution. Law 38 for 2005 denies the candidacy or the nomination to any legislative body in the government for a period of 10 years from the date of restoration of citizenship.¹⁴
- 12. NHRC stated that the death penalty is applicable in Qatar; however the death sentence was not implemented since 1995.¹⁵
- 13. NHRC was concerned about Law No. 3 for 2004 on Combating Terrorism, which grants prosecutors discretionary powers to extend pre-trial detention and take punitive measures restricting the right to freedom of movement and residence.¹⁶
- 14. On freedom of association and peaceful assembly, NHRC warned that law No. 18 for 2004 on Public Meetings and Demonstrations includes several provisions that impose restrictions on exercising this right. NHRC recommended that these restrictions should be reconsidered.¹⁷
- 15. NHRC stated that the law on Associations and Institutions should be revised in order to reduce restrictions on the procedures for establishing associations.¹⁸
- 16. NHRC noted that Qatar has recently witnessed a great breakthrough in the field of freedom of opinion and expression, at the level of individuals, media, and publishing. QNHRC recommended amending the Press and Media Law, which contains restrictions on the exercise of media activities. ¹⁹
- 17. NHRC stated that the lack of qualified professionals presents a challenge to the education of persons with disabilities, which in turn limits the acceptance of children with disabilities in schools.²⁰
- 18. NHRC noted that there are still many obstacles challenging [migrant] worker's rights, despite the efforts of the State. Domestic workers lack legal protection, while construction workers suffer poor working conditions, with some not getting their salaries and others suffer from ill treatment and poor living conditions.²¹
- 19. NHRC reported that workers function under harsh working conditions given the high temperature and humidity, in addition to dealing with hazardous material and equipment, which result in many cases of injuries.²²
- 20. NHRC observed that, domestic workers' rights constitute a significant challenge because they are more likely to be abused than others, due to violations of labour law and the lack of specific legislation regulating labour affairs. NHRC monitored cases where domestic workers were made to work excessive hours without being given adequate time off work in addition to their inability to resort to the Department of Labour.²³
- 21. NHRC noted the restriction against foreign workers as they may only leave the country temporarily or permanently on submission of an exit permit that can only be granted by their sponsor.²⁴
- 22. NHRC stated that in order for workers to file complaints at the Labour Court, they are obliged to pay fees to produce an expert report that examines their complaints against the employer. This is a long process before the civil and labour courts, and constitutes a major challenge for workers' rights, especially in the light of their inability to leave the country (during the litigation period) or switch employers.²⁵

II. Information provided by other stakeholders

A. Background and framework

1. Scope of international obligations

23. According to JS2, Qatar has ratified few international human rights instruments. Nevertheless, it has ratified ILO Convention 29 on Forced or Compulsory Labour and is bound as a member of the International Labour Organization (ILO) to respect the principles of freedom of association under the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.

2. Constitutional and legislative framework

- 24. According to the Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment for Children (GIEACPC), Qatar has accepted recommendations -in the first cycle- to end corporal punishment. However, the government needs to enact legislation that explicitly prohibits corporal punishment in schools, homes, and alternative care settings. A new legislation is needed in order to ensure that children convicted of 'hudud' or 'qisas' offences may not be sentenced to corporal punishment under 'Sharia'a' law.²⁶ AI voiced similar concerns.²⁷
- 25. JS1 expressed concern about the legislative and extra-legal measures taken by the Qatari Government, which drastically curbs civil society activism and the freedom of association for unions.²⁸
- 26. JS2 warned that the government both fails to maintain a legal framework sufficient to protect the rights of migrant workers consistent with international law and to enforce the legal protections that currently do exist. The employment of migrant workers in Qatar is governed largely by three laws Law 14 of 2004 (Labour Law); Law 4 of 2009 (Sponsorship Law); and, Law 15 of 2011 (Trafficking in Persons Law). Of particular concern, the sponsorship law, among the most restrictive in the Gulf region, facilitates the exaction of forced labour by, among other things, making it very difficult for a migrant worker to leave an abusive employer.²⁹
- 27. HRW noted that the situation of domestic workers remains an issue of grave concern. The Labour laws of Qatar do not cover domestic workers. Accordingly, a regional unified contract for domestic workers –expected to be approved by the government- falls well short of the minimum standards outlined in the recently adopted ILO Domestic Workers' Convention.³⁰
- 28. JS2 noted that while Qatari law prohibits recruitment agencies based and registered in Qatar from charging workers fees or costs for their recruitment. However, it does not address or seek to prohibit recruitment firms using affiliated organizations abroad that can, and do, charge these fees. The law also fails to place an affirmative duty on the employers to pay recruitment-related expenses.³¹

B. Implementation of international human rights obligations, taking into account applicable international humanitarian law

1. Equality and non-discrimination

29. Al Karama Foundation (AF) warned that even though Article 34 of the Qatari constitution guarantees equal treatment for all citizens, still, article 12 of the code governing nationality (Law No. 38/2005) shows that naturalized persons enjoy less protection because their Qatari nationality can be revoked at any time under a simple

proposition from the Minister of the Interior. The inequality between those who are of Qatari origin and those who are naturalized citizens is evident, as naturalized citizens do not enjoy the same political rights as those of Qatari origin. No matter how long naturalised citizens have held Qatari nationality, they cannot vote, nor can they stand for election.³²

30. AI noted that women continue to face discrimination in law and practice and are inadequately protected against violence within the family. In particular, family law discriminates against women, making it much easier for men to seek divorce than for women, and placing women at a severe economic disadvantage if they seek divorce or their husbands leave them.³³

2. Right to life, liberty and security of the person

- 31. AF noted that Qatar is yet to provide appropriate penalties for the crime of torture, taking into account the severity of the crime.³⁴
- 32. AF cited the case of an expatriate that highlights Qatar's violation of article 3 of the Convention against Torture (CAT). While working as an *Imam* of a mosque in Doha, he was summoned by the police on 18 October 2010 for questioning. The police informed him that he was under arrest on the grounds that he was wanted by third country authorities. He was then extradited to the third country without having being notified of his right to appeal against this decision. He is still being held in the same third country, where, as feared, he was severely tortured. This case highlights the need for the State to adopt specific legislation in this regard.³⁵
- 33. AI warned that gender-based violence, including rape and other forms of sexual abuse, is widespread, in particular against domestic workers, the vast majority of whom are foreign nationals. There is no specific law criminalizing domestic violence, although victims can make complaints of physical or sexual abuse under the Criminal Code. Testimonies from domestic workers interviewed by AI and interviews with migrant community representatives indicate that the use of physical violence and sexual abuse by employers both male and female is not unusual. Many domestic workers are fearful to report such abuse to the authorities, in some cases because they fear being accused of "illicit relations" which is a criminal offence under the Criminal Code.³⁶
- 34. AF remains concerned about the lack of legal provisions expressly prohibiting the expulsion, return or extradition of a person to another State where there were substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be subjected to torture as stipulated in article 3 of the Convention, as well as the absence of an effective appeals process available to persons likely to be subject to such measures.³⁷
- 35. AI reported information that since 2006 around a dozen people detained under the Protection of Society Law without charge or trial have been subjected to incommunicado detention for weeks or even months in some instances. In March 2013, two activists were arrested without a warrant at a checkpoint manned by plain-clothes security force personnel. They were held for 28 days without charge or trial, the first four days of which were incommunicado and in solitary confinement. After that they were granted irregular access to family and lawyers. On the day of their release, after being told that no prosecution would be brought against them, they received a text message from the Interior Ministry informing them that they were banned from leaving the country. No explanation was provided.³⁸
- 36. AI has documented cases of both construction and domestic workers in Qatar being subjected to conditions amounting to forced labour and human trafficking.³⁹

3. Administration of justice, including impunity (part to be added only if relevant), and the rule of law

- 37. AF argued that the independence of the judicial system remains to be a challenge, notably due to the fact that some of the judicial personnel are non-national individuals working on temporary contracts. They are generally originating from other Arab countries, and are directly appointed by the executive authorities. Their residency status may constitute a serious hindrance to their independence and capacity to exercise their functions serenely. The tenure principle of judges, which is essential to the independence of the judicial system, cannot be guaranteed under these conditions.⁴⁰
- 38. AF added that while the creation of the Supreme Judicial Council (an institution mandated to propose legislation relating to the judicial system and give advice on the appointment of judges) in 1999 was welcomed, the procedure for appointing members of the Council is contrary to the proclaimed objective of this institution, namely the independence of the justice system, because the power to appoint or revoke the totality of its members is left entirely up to the Emir.⁴¹
- 39. AI noted that under Qatar's Code of Criminal Procedures, detainees must be charged or released within 48 hours following arrest, unless a prosecutor extends their detention without charge for up to a further 16 days, following which they must be brought before a judge. The Code also stipulates that detainees must be informed of their right to contact whomever they wish. However, these guarantees do not apply where individuals are detained under Law No. 17 of 2002 on the Protection of Society and Law No. 3 of 2004 on Combating Terrorism. 42
- 40. HRW noted that authorities rarely, if ever, bring criminal prosecutions against employers for violating Qatar's labour or trafficking laws. 43

4. Freedom of movement

- 41. JS2 stated that under the Sponsorship Law of 2009, employers enjoy near total control over the movement of workers in their employ, including over their ability to reside in Qatar, to change jobs or even to leave the country. Workers under such control are often afraid to report abuses or assert their rights for fear of retaliation, which further contributes to their situation in forced labour.⁴⁴
- 42. HRW shared the same concerns, stating that all foreign workers must obtain an exit visa from their sponsor in order to leave Qatar. This exit visa requirement is not needed to prevent foreigners fleeing court cases in Qatar, as the Interior Ministry has separate powers to impose travel bans on non-citizens facing criminal charges or civil claims in Qatar's courts. There are also concerns over the arbitrary manner in which Qatar imposes indefinite travel bans against individuals accused of criminal or civil offences by their employers. The exit visa requirement and the authorities' use of arbitrary travel bans means that Qatari employers can prevent their foreign employees from leaving Qatar indefinitely, power they may use unfairly to secure concessions from foreign employees with whom they are in dispute. 45
- 43. JS2 highlighted another element of the abusive sponsorship system, which is the condition that migrant workers are forbidden to leave the country without the consent of the employer. Thus, even if the worker has the means to leave the country, they cannot freely do so without permission, making it difficult to leave abusive employment. In other cases, employers will extort the workers for money in order to grant them permission to leave 46. AF noted similar concerns. 47

5. Freedom of religion or belief, expression, association and peaceful assembly, and right to participate in public and political life

- 44. HRW stated that even though Qatar accepted recommendations to lift the restrictions on the rights to freedom of opinion and expression, and to take steps to promote freedom of the press in all forms of media, it has failed to do so, and the provisions of the draft Media Law of 2012 restrict the freedom of media and curtail the freedom of expression.⁴⁸
- 45. JS1 warned that despite legal guarantees for freedom of expression in the Constitution, the government continues to invoke restrictive and overboard legislation to arrest and imprison journalists and bloggers and other government critics who report the sensitive topics. JS1 added that the government continues to drastically limit access to international media and Internet news sites and strictly controls domestic media outlets. JS1 argued that the government's campaign to silence dissenting voices has severely jeopardised freedom of expression and has cast a chill over independent media.⁴⁹
- 46. Amnesty International (AI) noted that Freedom of expression is strictly controlled in Qatar, and the press often exercises self-censorship. The right to freedom of expression is further curtailed by the 2004 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, to which Qatar acceded in May 2008, and whose provisions risk criminalizing legitimate activities. The government has recently moved to further tighten its control over freedom of expression through new cybercrime and draft media laws. If approved, the new media law would require all publications to be approved by a government-appointed "competent authority" empowered to remove content or prevent printing. ⁵⁰
- 47. JS1 argued that the 1997 Press and Publications Law provide up to six months in prisons for individuals who criticize the Emir of Qatar or make attributions to him without express permission from his office⁵¹. HRW voiced similar concerns.⁵²
- 48. JS1 added that the 1997 Press and Publications Law contains several broad provisions placing blanket proscriptions on certain speech including requirements that journalists refrain from reporting on issues which may cause damage to the "supreme interest of the country" or are "offensive to public morals."
- 49. JS1 warned that journalists, citizens and poets continue to continue to come under attack and face judicial harassment for commenting on sensitive topics. A prominent poet was given a life sentence on 29 November 2012 for "inciting to overthrow the ruling regime" and "insulting the Emir" under articles 130 and 134 of the Penal Code. The sentence against the poet, who was arrested following a number of poems published on the Internet criticising the Emir of Qatar and calling for democratic reforms, was reduced to 15 years in February 2013⁵⁴. AF shared the same concerns.⁵⁵
- 50. JS1 noted that foreign journalists operating in Qatar are also subjected to a number of unwarranted and excessive restrictions. The Qatar Foreign Information Agency, responsible for the accreditation of all foreign journalists operating in the country, is endowed with the power to unilaterally and permanently ban journalists from entering Qatar without the provision of an official explanation. On 1 April 2011, two accredited journalists with Radio Television Suisse (RTS) were arrested while reporting on the preparation of the 2022 Football World Cup to be hosted in Qatar. Both journalists were fined and held for 13 days before being released.⁵⁶
- 51. JS1 stated that the government enforces highly discriminatory registration requirements, which provides the government with excessive powers to preclude the establishment of civil society organisations; hence, no independent human rights organisations are permitted to operate in the country. Under article 35 of the Associations and Private Institutions Law (Law No. 12 of 2004) CSOs are prohibited from participating

in undefined "political issues." Moreover, CSOs must secure authorization from the Ministry of Social Affairs, which can refuse to register an organization if it considers them a threat to the public interest. As result, the number of CSOs registered in the country remains highly limited.⁵⁷

- 52. JS2 noted that the current laws in Qatar violate the principles of freedom of association as the law forbids non-Qatari workers from membership in labour organisations, thus excluding more than 90 per cent of the total workforce in the country.⁵⁸
- 53. JS1 warned that the broad proscriptions on the right to strike further undermine freedom of association for unions. According to Article 120 of Labour Law No. 14 of 2004 it is impermissible for civil servants, domestic and public health workers or members of the security services to hold a strike. Moreover, migrant workers are also explicitly forbidden from holding strikes. In September 2010 more than 90 Nepali migrant workers employed by a construction company were arrested for conducting an "illegal" strike. The workers were jailed and kept without food for several days before being finally deported. Moreover, employees with the company for less than two years were forced to cover their own travel expenses to return home.⁵⁹
- 54. Regarding freedom of assembly, JS1 noted that article 44 of the Qatari Constitution provides that the "right of the citizens to assemble is guaranteed in accordance with the provisions of the law." Nonetheless, despite these legal guarantees, the government has put in place a number of stringent limitations to this right. Consequently, public demonstrations, including rallies and protests, remain almost non-existent in Qatar.⁶⁰
- 55. AF noted that political parties in Qatar have not been granted the right to freedom of association given the administrative processes that remain a major deterrent from forming and registering political parties.⁶¹

6. Right to work and to just and favourable conditions of work

- 56. AI noted that foreign migrant workers continue to be exploited and abused by their employers despite protective provisions set out in the 2004 Labour Law and related decrees. The protections in the Labour Law are not adequately enforced, and the Law specifically excludes domestic workers and some other categories of workers, thereby providing no legal protection to a significant proportion of workers in Qatar. ⁶²
- 57. AF noted with concern that a significant number of workers are from the Indian subcontinent and work in the construction industry. Their working conditions are difficult and accommodation deplorable. They do not benefit from social rights and legally speaking, are placed at the mercy of their employers.⁶³
- 58. JS2 warned that migrant workers have reported finding themselves in exploitative situations, such as being paid far lower than promised wages, experiencing numerous unspecified deductions from wages, not being paid at all for months and/or living in abysmal living conditions with dozens of co-workers crammed into small unventilated shelters without proper plumbing, water and electricity.⁶⁴
- 59. Human Rights Watch (HRW) noted with concern that workers typically pay exorbitant recruitment fees and employers regularly take control of their passports when they arrive in Qatar. The sponsorship (*kafala*) system ties a migrant worker's legal residence to his or her employer, or "sponsor." Migrant workers commonly complain that employers fail to pay their wages on time or at all, but they are barred from changing jobs without their sponsoring employer's consent other than in exceptional cases and with express Interior Ministry permission.⁶⁵
- 60. JS2 added that migrant workers cannot freely seek better conditions with different employers, as they are unable to transfer employment without the consent of the

exploitative employer. Those who nevertheless quit their job without permission must be reported to the authorities as having absconded. For the fleeing worker, it is no defence under the sponsorship law that the employer has engaged in abuse or failed to pay wages for example. While workers suffering such abuse are supposed to have their sponsorship transferred if a legal action has commenced, this rarely happens in practice.⁶⁶

- 61. HRW stated that workers can become undocumented when employers report them as having absconded, or when they fail to pay to renew workers' annual ID cards. A lack of proper documentation leaves workers at constant risk of arrest and detention or deportation, and at even greater risk of labour exploitation.⁶⁷
- 62. AI argued that the sponsorship law of 2009, which requires all foreign workers to obtain a sponsor's permission to leave Qatar or change employer, is exploited by employers to deter foreign workers from complaining to the authorities or moving to a new job in the event of abuse. There is a mechanism within the Sponsorship Law for workers to move jobs in the event of "abuse" by their sponsors, but only 49 people were transferred permanently and 211 temporarily by this means in 2012. Although the Sponsorship Law prohibits employers from confiscating workers' passports, this provision of the Law is not adequately enforced.⁶⁸
- 63. JS2 argued that migrant workers have no effective means of redress, and that the government does little to protect the rights of workers, such as remedy the abuses, or sanction the perpetrators.⁶⁹
- 64. JS2 noted that the language barrier does not permit a thorough follow through of complaints presented by migrant workers. The inspectors, who are supposed to deal with complaints, can only speak Arabic and few speak English, while the workers who are mostly vulnerable to exploitation, can communicate in languages other than their own. The absence of interpretation or inspectors with languages abilities hinders the ability of migrant workers to file their complaints.⁷⁰
- 65. JS2 warned that fear is another factor that forms an obstacle against the workers' abilities to file their complaints. Employers who learn of complaints are able to terminate the employment relationship. This renders their status in the country illegal and subject to arrest and/or deportation. Thus, many workers suffer exploitation for fear of retaliation.⁷¹
- 66. According to JS2, the law prohibits migrant workers in Qatar from associating and forming unions, to defend their rights. They have no effective means to combat forced labour or to otherwise bargain over the terms and conditions of their work. The country's labour inspection and justice system have proven highly inadequate to enforce the few rights that migrant workers do have under Qatari law.⁷²
- 67. JS2 warned that the lack of freedom of association in Qatar is ultimately responsible for the deaths of numerous migrant workers, who face punishing working conditions on the job, including long hours of intensely physical work in extreme heat, construction work without proper safety equipment or safe and appropriate building methods and squalid living conditions in which workers are packed into sweltering barracks with little if any ventilation.⁷³
- 68. JS1 added that the right to freedom of association and to collective bargaining for unions also remains severely curtailed in Qatar. Under the Labour Code, the establishment of independent unions is strictly prohibited. Accordingly, all union activity must be conducted under the auspices of the General Union of Workers of Qatar which is a government established and supervised union. However, according to the Article 3 of Labour Law No. 14 of 2004 a number of professional sectors are strictly excluded from joining the General Union of Workers. Among those excluded, include persons employed by the government, members of the armed forces and police personnel and all domestic and

agricultural workers. In addition, migrant workers, which make up 94 per cent of Qatar's workforce, are completely precluded from joining the union.⁷⁴

- 69. HRW stated that migrant workers are prohibited from unionizing or engaging in strikes, although they constitute 99 per cent of the private sector workforce.⁷⁵
- 70. JS2 added that the right to strike is effectively non-existent. Only Qatari nationals (a very small segment of the workforce) are allowed to strike, however they face restrictive conditions that make exercising this right nearly impossible.⁷⁶

7. Right to social security and to an adequate standard of living

71. HRW noted with concern that migrant workers live in cramped and unsanitary conditions, especially those working without documentation.⁷⁷

8. Migrants, refugees and asylum seekers

- 72. According to JS2, migrant workers in Qatar constitute -roughly- 94 per cent of the workforce of Qatar or 1.2 million workers. That number continues to rise as substantial numbers of workers continue to be recruited, largely from South Asia, to build the infrastructure and stadia for the 2022 World Cup. 78
- 73. Human Rights Watch (HRW) warned that even though Qatar is upgrading its infrastructure for the 2022 FIFA World Cup, the government has yet to implement reforms that are needed to afford foreign migrant workers adequate protection against serious rights abuses, including forced labour and trafficking. Since Qatar's previous UPR in 2010, Qatar has not taken any steps to reform legislation that facilitates these abuses and has therefore failed to implement the UPR recommendations that it accepted to "ensure that its domestic laws guarantee the protection of the human rights of migrant workers, including their right to freedom of movement and the right to an adequate standard of living" and to "reform the sponsorship system in order to protect employees in the event of conflict."
- 74. JS2 warned that from the moment they begin the process of seeking work in Qatar, migrant workers are drawn into a highly exploitative system that facilitates the extortion of forced labour, by their employers.⁸⁰
- 75. With regards to contracts and recruitment, JS2 noted that upon arrival in Qatar, workers are typically offered a new contract upon arrival in Qatar that bears little resemblance to what was promised or contracted in the country of origin. These contracts may be for a completely different job than described and often at wages that are lower than promised. Once workers are in Qatar, however, they have no truly effective options to seek redress and thus most simply accept the new, inferior conditions. The new contract terms often make it difficult for the worker to honour financial obligations to recruiters or lenders that fronted the money for the trip to Qatar.⁸¹

9. Human rights and counter-terrorism

76. AI stated that individuals detained under the Protection of Society Law can be held without charge or trial for up to six months by order of the Minister of Interior acting on the recommendation of the Director General of Public Security. Such administrative detention without charge or trial may then be extended for up to two years at the discretion of the Prime Minister. Article 3 of the law provides that detainees or their relatives may appeal in writing to the Prime Minister against the detention or its renewal. However, detention is not subject to any judicial supervision or oversight, and the courts have no jurisdiction to hear challenges to such detention or to order the release of detainees. The law also makes no provision for detainees to have access to relatives or legal counsel, effectively allowing them to be held incommunicado.⁸²

Notes

¹ The stakeholders listed below have contributed information for this summary; the full texts of all original submissions are available at: www.ohchr.org. Civil society Individual submissions: AF Al Karama Foundation, Geneva, Switzerland; ΑI Amnesty International, London, UK; **GIEACPC** Global Initiative to end all Corporal Punishment of Children, London, UK; Human Rights Watch, Geneva, Switzerland. HRW Joint submissions: Joint submission 1 submitted by: CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, JS1 Johannesburg (South Africa); and GCHR: Gulf Centre for Human Rights, Dublin, Ireland; JS2 Joint submission 2 submitted by: ITUC: International Trade Union Confederation, Brussels, Belgium. National human rights institution (s): National Human Rights Committee for Qatar, Doha, Qatar. *NHRC ² NHRC, p. 9. NHRC, pp. 9-12. NHRC, p. 27. NHRC, p. 13. NHRC, p. 27. NHRC, p. 27. NHRC, p. 27. ⁹ NHRC, p. 27. ¹⁰ NHRC, p. 5. See also pp. 15. ¹¹ NHRC, p. 5. ¹² NHRC, p. 30. ¹³ NHRC, p. 6. ¹⁴ NHRC, p 14. ¹⁵ NHRC, p. 13. ¹⁶ NHRC, p. 13. ¹⁷ NHRC, p. 14. ¹⁸ NHRC, p. 15. ¹⁹ NHRC, p. 17. ²⁰ NHRC, p. 20. ²¹ NHRC, p. 5. ²² NHRC, p. 21. NHRC, p. 21. NHRC, p. 17. 25 NHRC, p. 16. GIEACPC, p. 2.

- ²⁷ AI, p. 3.
- ²⁸ CIVICUS, p. 2.
- ²⁹ ITUC, p. 2.
- ³⁰ HRW, p. 2.
- ³¹ JS2, p. 3.
- ³² AF, Para. 14, p. 4.
- ³³ AI, p. 3.
- ³⁴ AF, Para. 25, p. 5.
- ³⁵ AF, Para 27, p. 5.
- ³⁶ AI, p. 3.
- ³⁷ AF, Para. 26, p. 5.
- ³⁸ AI, p. 2.
- ³⁹ AI, p. 3.
- ⁴⁰ AF, Para. 11, p. 2.
- ⁴¹ AF, Para. 12, p. 2.

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<sup>42</sup> AI, p. 2.
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